Key Takeaways:
- DOJ's new M&A safe harbor policy places even more emphasis on effective due diligence and the voluntary self-disclosure of corporate wrongdoing to obtain the presumption of a declination of criminal prosecution.
- DOJ establishes a baseline six-month post-closing window to make the self-disclosure and will require effective remediation including disgorgement.
- DOJ's National Security Division announced its first-ever Chief Counsel and Deputy Chief Counsel for Corporate Enforcement, signaling the deployment of more resources to the intersection of national security and corporate criminal enforcement.
On October 4, 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ") announced a new Mergers & Acquisitions
("M&A") Safe Harbor Policy to further encourage
self-disclosures and provide companies with additional
predictability in the M&A context. Recognizing the net
compliance benefit that can occur when a company with an effective
compliance program acquires and remediates a company with an
ineffective program and a history of misconduct, the DOJ's
newly-announced policy is that an acquirer who (a) promptly and
voluntarily discloses criminal misconduct within the Safe Harbor
period, (b) cooperates fully with the ensuing investigation, and
(c) carries out appropriate remediation, will receive a presumption
of declination of criminal prosecution. For more than 15 years, the
DOJ has been attempting to promote the benefits of voluntary
disclosure of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations in the
M&A context on a case-by-case basis; this new policy is
intended both to create predictability and require consistent
implementation across all divisions within the DOJ. Essentially,
the DOJ is attempting to provide acquirers with more of an ability
to reduce the overall risk profile of an M&A transaction by
conducting effective diligence and making a disclosure.
The DOJ will use a period of six months from the acquisition
closing date as the baseline Safe Harbor period, but also warned
that, especially in the national security context, a company should
not "wait for a deadline to self-disclose." The DOJ will
expect remediation to occur within one year of closing, noting that
in particularly complex circumstances that period could be
extended. From the DOJ's perspective, full cooperation should
include disclosure of individual culpability, and appropriate
remediation should include restitution/disgorgement of any
ill-gotten gains. The policy applies whether the misconduct is
discovered pre- or post- closing, although there is obvious benefit
to discovering misconduct during pre-acquisition diligence. And the
DOJ was careful to stress that the presence of aggravating factors
at the acquired entity will not affect the benefit afforded to the
acquirer. However, the DOJ also indicated that the presence of
aggravating factors at the acquired entity may mean that the
acquired entity itself may not benefit from voluntary
self-disclosure benefits but left room for the possibility of a
declination for even the acquired entity if aggravating factors are
not present. Finally, the policy makes clear that an acquirer that
fails to conduct effective diligence will remain subject to full
successor liability.
This new policy follows on the heels of the DOJ's announcement
last month of the hiring of the first-ever
Chief Counsel and Deputy Chief Counsel for Corporate Enforcement in
the DOJ's National Security Division to "coordinate and
oversee the Division's investigation and prosecution of
corporate crime relating to the national security of the United
States." Ian C. Richardson will be taking on the role of Chief
Counsel, while Christian J. Nauvel will serve as Deputy Chief
Counsel—both of whom have significant prosecutorial
experience. These appointments reinforce the DOJ's commitment
to investigating and prosecuting corporate crime viewed through a
national security lens, which often—as described
below—may involve interagency collaboration.
Deputy Attorney General ("AG") Lisa Monaco's remarks earlier this year made clear that the
DOJ would be committing a "surge of resources" to
addressing the connection between national security and corporate
crime. A couple of months later, another DOJ official noted that between October 2022 and May 2023
"roughly two-thirds of the department's major corporate
criminal resolutions have implicated United States national
security" and went on to describe how—particularly given
ever-evolving technology—concerns about U.S. adversaries
using innovative methods requires companies to "pay a new
level of attention to a wider range of national security compliance
issues than ever before." The official recommended that
companies be especially sensitive to "high-risk actors,
high-risk areas, and high-risk internal activity" and conveyed
a simple message: "national security laws must rise to the top
of your compliance risk chart." The DOJ announced that 25 new
prosecutors would be hired in support of this effort.
The DOJ is also committed to collaborating with other agencies to,
among other things, prevent the "illegal export of sensitive
technology" because it "is a direct threat to our
national security." As covered in our prior alert, the Disruptive Technology Strike
Force ("DTSF") was established earlier this year in a
collaboration between the FBI, Homeland Security and multiple U.S.
Attorney's Offices, headed jointly by the DOJ and the
Department of Commerce. Notably, the DTSF seeks to work with
entities in the private sector to identify national security
issues—for example, by asking companies to provide leads to
the DTSF—and address them. It would not be surprising if the
new Chief and Deputy Chief Counsel leveraged collaborative efforts
between private entities and initiatives like the DTSF to meet
their objective of addressing the connection between corporate
crime and national security.
In sum, the DOJ's new M&A Safe Harbor Policy and its
deployment of additional resources to address corporate crime with
national security implications reinforce the need for private
sector actors—particularly those in industries that
historically have not been associated with national security
concerns—to start paying closer attention to compliance risks
that come with advanced technology and innovation and strengthen
their compliance programs. Attorneys at Foley Hoag have years of
experience with evaluating and improving corporate compliance
programs, as well as with representing individuals and entities in
DOJ investigations.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.