The Hon'ble Constitution Bench, of the Apex Court comprising of Hon'ble Justice Arun Mishra, Justice Indira Banerjee, Justice Vineet Saran, Justice M. R. Shah and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, vide Judgment dated 4th March, 2020, disposed-off Civil Appeal No.1094110942 of 2013, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., along with other connected civil appeals, and clarified that the consumer courts cannot grant time to the Opposite Party to file a reply beyond a total period of 45 days, as mandated under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
The Constitution Bench vide instant judgment addressed, discussed and settled the following two questions:
a) Whether the District Forum has the power to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days as mandated by Section 13(2)(a) of the Act?
b) What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under Section 13 of the Act?
1. OBJECT OF THE ACT
The Hon'ble Supreme Court contended that the main motive of the Act is to provide expeditious disposal of the consumer disputes and that it is for the protection and benefit of the consumer. The statement of objects and reasons, states that the act is to provide speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes. Further, the preamble of the Consumer Protection Act also mentions that the Act is to provide for better protection of the consumer interest.
2. THE HON'BLE BENCH WHILE HIGHLIGHTING THE EMPHASIS ON SPEEDY DISPOSAL OF THE CONSUMER DISPUTES, HIGHLIGHTED THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS
i) Sub section 2(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Act provides that where no response is filed by the opposite party, the complaint may be decided exparte on the basis of evidence brought forth by the complainant.
ii) Sub Section 2(c) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act further provides that where the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing before the District Forum, the District Forum may either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits.
iii) (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which was inserted by Act 62 of 2002, also provides for deciding every complaint as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to decide the complaint within a period of three months from the receipt of notice by the opposite party, and within five months, if the complaint requires analysis or testing of commodities.
iv) Sub section (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which clearly provides that "No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in the subsection (1) and (2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with". The intention of the legislature thus, is clear that mere denial of further extension of time for filing the response (by the opposite party) would not amount to denial or violation of the principles of natural justice.
v) Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005, clearly provides that, ordinarily, notice to the opposite party to file its response shall be issued for a period of 30 days, but the same can be even less than 30 days, depending upon the circumstances of each case.
3. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS RELIED UPON BY THE HON'BLE BENCH FOR COMPUTING LIMITATION PERIOD, WHEREVER IT IS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED BY THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
i) Lachmi Narain v. Union of India1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, "if the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the interest that the provision is to be mandatory".
ii) Bhikraj Jaipurai v. Union of India2, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "It may be said that the view that the provisions in the Constitution relating to the form of contracts on behalf of the Government are mandatory may involve hardship to the unwary. But a person who seeks to contract with the Government must be deemed to be fully aware of statutory requirements as to the form in which the contract is to be made".
iii) In Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma3, the Apex Court has held that, "There may be a statutory provision, which causes great hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigor. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the statute. If the language is plain and hence, allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice".
iv) In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer4, The Apex Court has held that, "It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party, but the court has no choice but to enforce it".
4. THE HON'BLE BENCH WHILE CONSIDERING THE ASPECTS OF LAW AND EQUITY, REFERRED TO THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENTS AND ASSERTIVELY REITERATED THE SETTLED LAW, THAT LAW SHALL ALWAYS PREVAIL OVER EQUITY
a) Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs State of Maharashtra5, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that "When there is a conflict between law and equity the former shall prevail".
b) P.M. Latha vs State of Kerala6, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that "This Court held that Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settled law".
c) In Nasiruddin vs Sita Ram Agarwal7, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, "In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom."
d) In E. Palanisamy vs Palanisamy8, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "Equitable considerations have no place where the statute contained express provisions".
e) India House vs Kishan N. Lalwani9, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations".
5. POSITION OF LAW UNDER VARIOUS STATUTES FOR NON-FILING OF RESPONSE BY THE OPPOSITE PARTY/RESPONDENT WITHIN THE LIMITATION PERIOD, WHERE THE STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD IS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED
a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908
i) The language of 13(2) of the Act is not pari materia to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). The Hon'ble Bench stressed upon regulation 26 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005, which clearly mandates that endeavor is to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the Code except for such provisions, which have been referred to in the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, which is provided for in respect of specific matters enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act.
ii) The Hon'ble Bench also noted that the Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10 of the code, prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days provided under Order VIII Rule is actually not meant to be mandatory, but only directory. Whereas, sub section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for the consequence of the complaint to be proceeded ex parte against the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to represent his case within the time given.
b) Commercial Courts Act, 2015
The Hon'ble Bench also emphasized that under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code, for suits filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a proviso has been introduced for commercial disputes of a specified value, which reads as, "Provided further that no Court shall make an Order to extend the time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filing the written statement". Thus, for commercial suits, time for filing written statement provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is meant to be mandatory, not directory. The Hon'ble Bench relied upon SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited10, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, ".... the clear, definite and mandatory provisions of Order V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be circumvented by recourse to the inherent power under Section 151 to do the opposite of what is stated therein". It was, thus, clarified that there was no scope for extending the time for filing of written statement beyond the period of 120 days in commercial suits, as the provision with regard to such suits would be mandatory, and not directory.
c) Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian11em> , while dealing with the provisions of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, held that the Special Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the petition under Section 4(2) of the said Act. The Apex Court observed, "It is not for the courts to determine whether the period of 30 days is too short to take into account the various misfortunes that may be faced by notified persons who wish to file objections under Section 4(2) of the Act nor can the section be held to be directory because of such alleged inadequacy of time."
6. CONTRARY VIEWS HELD IN PRIOR RULINGS OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN CONTEXT OF TIME LIMITATION FOR FILING RESPONSE BY THE OPPOSITE PARTY UNDER SECTION 13 OF ACT
The Apex Court, in the matter of Topline Shoes Ltd. vs. Corporation Bank12, while dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, has held that the said provision would be directory and not mandatory. The court relied on the principles of natural justice, and also that no consequence of non-filing of the response to the complaint within 45 days is provided for in the Consumer Protection Act. The Hon'ble Court was also of the view that in the Act, no consequence is provided in case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total period of 45 days.
Whereas, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Dr. J.J. Merchant vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi13 , has held that the time limit prescribed for filing the response to the complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, as provided under Section 13(2)(a), is to be strictly adhered to, i.e. the same is mandatory, and not directory. The Hon'ble Court while deciding the aforesaid matter, also considered the Statement of Objects and Reasons, salient features of the act which aimed to provide simple, inexpensive and speedy justice to the consumers.
The Hon'ble Court further considered that in Sub section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13, the opening sentence "on the basis of evidence" has been substituted by "ex parte on the basis of evidence". By this amendment, consequences of not filing the response to the complaint within the specified limit of 45 days was to be that the District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant, where the opposite party omits or fails to take action to represent his case within time.
It was further noticed that Sub section (3A) of Section 13 was inserted, providing that the complaint should be heard as expeditiously as possible and that endeavor should be made to normally decide the complaint within 3 months, and within 5 months where analysis or testing of commodities was required. The provisos to the said Sub section required that no adjournment should be ordinarily granted and if granted, it should be for sufficient cause to be recorded in writing and on imposition of cost, and if the complaint could not be decided within the specified period, reasons for the same were to be recorded at the time of disposing of the complaint.
It was thus, under these circumstances the Apex Court held that the time limit of 30 days plus 15 days in filing the response to the complaint, be mandatorily and strictly adhered to.
That after giving due consideration to the views taken by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid matters, the Court vide its judgment in the matter of NIA vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage14, agreed with the view taken in the Dr. J.J. Merchant vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi and held that, "We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment delivered in J.J. Merchant holds the field and therefore, we reiterate the view that the District Forum can grant a further period of 15 days to the opposite party for filing his version or reply and not beyond that".
7. COMMENCING POINT OF LIMITATION FOR FILING RESPONSE BY THE OPPOSITE PARTY UNDER SECTION 13 OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986
The other question qua commencing point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under Section 13 of the Act was also determined by the Constitution Bench, i.e. whether the limitation under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act for filing the response by the opposite party to the complaint would commence from the date of receipt of the notice of the complaint by the opposite party, or the receipt of notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint.
The Constitution Bench in order to decide the aforesaid question, analysed that Sub sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of Section13 of the Consumer Protection Act specify that the copy of the complaint is to be given to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days. As such, from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the copy of the admitted complaint, which is to be served, after which the period to file the response would commence. Further the Hon'ble Bench also relied upon regulation 10(5) of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005, which mentions that "along with the notice, copies of the complaint, memorandum of grounds of appeal, petitions as the case may be and other documents filed shall be served upon the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s)".
The Hon'ble bench further placed its reliance upon Nahar Enterprises vs Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd.,15 , Union of India vs Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors16em> , and emphasized that wherever limitation is provided, either for filing response/written statement or filling an appeal, it is the copy of the plaint or the order/award which is to be served on the party concerned after which alone would commence the period of limitation.
Thus, the Hon'ble Constitution Bench in the instant matter, after analyzing various provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Consumer Protection Regulations 2005, position of law for filing response by the Opposite Party/ Respondents under various statutes and due consideration to various judicial precedents, has concluded that, the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act; and that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and the judgment shall operate prospectively.
Footnotes
1 (1976) 2 SCC 953
2 AIR 1962 SC 113
3 (2013) 11 SCC 451
4 (2013) 10 SCC 765
5 (2003) 5 SCC 413
6 (2003) 3 SCC 541
7 (2003) 2 SCC 577
8 (2003) 1 SCC 123
9 (2003) 9 SCC 393
10 (2019) 12 SCC 210
11 (2004) 11 SCC 472
12 (2002) 6 SCC 33
13 (2002) 6 SCC 635
14 (2015) 16 SCC 22
15 (2007) 9 SCC 466
16 (2005) 4 SCC 239
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