A plaintiff who raises a products-liability claim must
ordinarily come forward with evidence of some specific
design or manufacturing defect in the product at issue. In cases
where evidence of a specific defect is unavailable, however,
plaintiffs often attempt to get past summary judgment by arguing
that the product must have had some unspecified and indeterminate
defect under the "malfunction theory" of products
liability.1 Thanks to the successful advocacy of Day
Pitney's Paul Williams and John
Cerreta, plaintiffs' ability to inject the malfunction
theory into products-liability cases at the summary-judgment stage
should now be more limited, under the Connecticut Supreme
Court's September 15 decision in White v. Mazda Motor of
America, Inc., 2014 WL 4548058 (Conn. 2014).
In White, the plaintiff claimed that, as he was checking
the conditions under the hood of his automobile, his vehicle caught
fire and ignited a "small blast," which then caused the
plaintiff to fall down and injure his knee. In his complaint, the
plaintiff alleged this "blast" had been caused by a
specific design defect in the fuel lines and fuel rail of his
automobile. But on summary judgment, the trial court rejected this
claim because the plaintiff had failed to come forward with any
competent expert testimony establishing this specific defect.
The plaintiff appealed and argued that, even without proof of a
specific defect, his products-liability claim should still have
survived summary judgment because the evidence raised an inference
of some unspecified dangerous condition under the malfunction
theory of products liability. In a split decision, the Connecticut
Appellate Court declined to consider this argument and held that
the plaintiff forfeited any malfunction claim by failing to raise
the point in his opposition to summary judgment.2 The
Connecticut Supreme Court then granted the plaintiff's petition
for further review, limited to two issues: (1) whether the
plaintiff adequately preserved his malfunction claim in the trial
court, and (2) on the merits, whether the plaintiff had presented
enough evidence to get past summary judgment under the malfunction
theory.3
In a 5-2 decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's judgment and again rejected the plaintiff's claims.
In a majority opinion penned by Justice Zarella, the state high
court clarified that "[a] product liability claim under the
malfunction theory is distinct from an ordinary product
claim." In order to rely on this distinct theory at the
summary-judgment stage, the court continued, a products-liability
plaintiff must first plead facts in the complaint that tend to
establish the malfunction theory's distinct elements - namely,
(1) that the incident causing the alleged injury would not
ordinarily occur absent some product defect, and (2) that this
unspecified defect was most likely attributable to the manufacturer
and not some other "reasonably possible
cause."4 The court concluded that, because the
plaintiff's complaint had pleaded only a specific
defect in the vehicle's fuel system, the pleading had failed to
"put the trial court and the defendant on notice" of the
plaintiff's intent to rely on the malfunction theory's
"alternative burden of proof."5 As a result,
the plaintiff was barred from injecting the malfunction theory into
the case in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.6
While the majority's decision in White avoided making
any broad pronouncements on the malfunction theory's
substantive requirements, its clarification of the pleading
standards for malfunction claims should still be an important
precedent for defendants facing products-liability claims in
Connecticut. Under White, no more will plaintiffs be
permitted to plead and attempt to prove a specific product defect,
only to fall back on an un-pleaded claim under the malfunction
theory at the summary-judgment stage.
To read the court's opinion in White, click here. For Justice Eveleigh's dissent,
click here. Earlier news coverage of the briefing
and oral argument in White is also available here.
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[1] See Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Deere, 302 Conn. 123, 131, 133-34 & n.5 (2011).
[2] White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 139 Conn. App. 39,
46 n.9 (2012).
[3] White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 307 Conn. 949
(2013).
[4] White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., __ Conn. __,
2014 WL 4548058, *6 (Conn. 2014).
[5] Id. at *7.
[6] Id.
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