The UK Government is considering the shape of the country's future regime for the 'exhaustion' of intellectual property rights.

Why do I need to know this? Because the regime settled upon will govern rules on parallel imports of genuine goods into the UK - what genuine goods can be imported into the UK and from where. If your business is involved in or interested in the movement into the UK of goods protected by a trademark or a patent, then you need to understand the law on 'exhaustion' of intellectual property in the UK.

What do I need to know? You need to know what the law in the UK is now, and how it may change before too long. So we explain below.

At the moment the law regarding genuine goods bearing a registered trademark is clear, but some aspects of the law regarding genuine patented goods are less clear; and following the Government's consultation, both regimes may change. Understanding what a new regime might look like requires understanding of the law as it stands currently in the UK, and of how it stood before the current, broadly described 'EEA-regional exhaustion' regime, was developed.

So here are the key points you need to know, in respect of patents and trademarks:

  • For registered trademarks today, the UK continues to recognise and apply the EEA-regional exhaustion regime. The EEA-regional exhaustion regime has two fundamental features: (1) exhaustion in respect of goods placed on the market in the EEA by the trademark owner or with their consent, and (2) no exhaustion for goods placed on the market outside the EEA by the trademark owner or with their consent.
  • Historically, the UK's registered trademark system developed as a codification of the law of passing off. So when understanding the historical approach to exhaustion in the UK in respect of trademarks, the place to start is with the law of passing off. Historically and still today, in cases of alleged passing off, the question of whether sale in the UK of parallel imported genuine goods is tortious depends upon whether the elements of passing off are established. These are: goodwill (in the UK); misrepresentation (in the UK); and damage. In applying and assessing these elements, imported goods are treated no differently to goods sold by the brand owner within the UK. Although the word 'exhaustion' is not used or seen as a type of defence in respect of passing off, the regime could most fairly be described as a form of international exhaustion.
  • Similarly, before the UK joined the European Economic Community in 1973, a question of whether sale in the UK of parallel imported genuine goods infringed a registered trademark was considered by applying fundamental principles of trademark law without discriminating according to the geographical origins of the goods concerned. Although inconsistencies existed in the case law, the more authoritative judgments established the approach as a form of international exhaustion.
  • For trademarks, the first of the fundamental features of the EEA's region exhaustion regime was introduced by the Court of Justice's 1974 ruling in Centrafarm v Sterling1: putting goods into circulation in a Member State exhausted the registered trademark owner's rights in respect of those goods across the Community.
  • In respect of goods parallel imported from outside the EEA, the UK continued to apply its international approach to questions of infringement of registered trademarks until the Court of Justice's 1998 ruling in Silhouette v Hartlauer2, which introduced the second of the fundamental features of the EEA-regional exhaustion regime noted above.
  • For patents today, it is not accurate to say that the UK's exhaustion regime is or remains that of the EEA-regional exhaustion regime provided for by Court of Justice in respect of trademarks. Certainly the EEA-regional exhaustion defence (fundamental feature (1) noted above) applies in respect of genuine goods first placed on the market within the EU/EEA by the patent owner or with their consent and subsequently parallel imported in to the UK3. However, no legislation or case law has introduced in the UK in respect of patents the second fundamental feature noted above of the EEA-regional exhaustion regime. In view of the long-standing authority of Betts v Willmott (and subsequent authorities developing the doctrine of 'implied licence') in the UK4, for genuine goods first placed on the market outside the EU/EEA by the patent owner or with their consent and subsequently parallel imported in to the UK, the better view is that the UK's doctrine of 'implied licence' remains good law.
  • The UK's doctrine of implied licence is conceptually different to the concept of exhaustion as it is understood in EU law or in the law of the United States. The doctrine is that the purchase of a patented article carries with it the right to use or deal in the article in any way the purchaser choses unless the purchaser knows of restrictions communicated by the patentee by the time of purchase. The right is in the form of an implied licence, and it applies whether the purchase of the article is from the patentee or from an earlier purchaser. If the purchase is without notice of conditions, the purchaser is free to use and deal with the article as they choose. But for as long as subsequent purchasers have notice of the patentee's conditions by the time of their purchase, the conditions continue to attach to the goods and the patentee may assert their rights under patent law in respect of dealings outside of the conditions. The doctrine of implied licence does not discriminate according to the geographical origins of the goods concerned, and so in that sense it is most fairly described as international.
  • However, for goods first placed on the market outside the EU/EEA by a licensee rather than the patentee, the operation in the UK the implied licence doctrine is less clear, and is discussed below in the drop-down section for patents.

The UK's 'exhaustion' regime therefore does not have a history of being national in its reach, for patents or for trademarks. More detail of the history and operation of both regimes is discussed below in the drop-down menus.

When considering options for the UK's future exhaustion regime, stakeholders should also be aware of the approach taken by trading partners of the UK. More on this will follow.

Further detail

Patents

Patent law in the UK historically has not discriminated between goods originally placed on the market in the UK by the owner of the relevant patent and the same goods first placed on the market by that owner outside the UK and then parallel imported into the UK. The UK's approach to 'exhaustion' prior to and outside of EU law has, therefore, been international, broadly speaking.

However, it is important to distinguish between the concept of exhaustion developed in European law (and in a similar way in the United States of America), and the how the law in the UK has approached questions of patent infringement in respect of parallel imported genuine goods. Under the European doctrine of exhaustion, once the goods have been placed on the market in the EU or EEA by the owner of the patent or with their consent, the owner's rights to control subsequent dealings the goods have been exhausted and so no longer exist. In contrast, under the UK's doctrine of 'implied licence' or 'Betts v Wilmott' principle, patent law is applied in the same way to all the genuine patented goods, irrespective of where they were first placed on the market.

The UK's doctrine of implied licence developed against the background of the specific nature of the right conferred by the grant of a patent in the UK: the Statute of Monopolies of 1623, section 6, confirmed that patents conferring monopolies could continue to be granted by the exercise of the royal prerogative, and the provision remains in force in the UK today. Conceptually, this meant that the grant of a patent could confer upon the patentee more than merely a negative right to exclude others; arguably it conferred also a positive right to control subsequent use of the patented goods. Against this background, the doctrine of implied licence emerged as a way of preventing the owner of a patent from unduly seeking to control dealings in the patented goods after their first purchase.

In a judgment of the Chancery Appeals Court dating to the early 1870s, Betts v Willmott5, it was held that where a person owning a patent in the UK manufactures patented articles and places them on the market, whether in the UK or abroad, they transfer with the goods the licence to use them wherever the purchaser pleases. The purchaser of the goods has control of them unless there is clear and explicit agreement to the contrary.

Subsequent case law established that, therefore, the purchase of a patented article carries with it the right to use or deal in the article in any way the purchaser chose unless the purchaser knew the restrictions communicated by the patentee by the time of purchase. The right was in the form of an implied licence. This applied whether the purchase of the article was from the patentee or from an earlier purchaser. If the purchase was without notice of conditions, the purchaser was free to use and deal with the article as they chose. But for as long as subsequent purchasers had notice of the patentee's conditions by the time of their purchase, the conditions continued to attach to the goods and the patentee could assert their rights under patent law in respect of dealings outside of the conditions.6 Today, this is referred to as the 'doctrine of implied licence' or the 'Betts v Willmott principle'. The implied licence includes a licence to repair the article, but not to make a new article7.

A licensee under a patent stands in a different position from the purchaser of an article made under the patent. Where a licensee for a foreign territory seeks to import goods into the UK outside the terms of its licence, the patentee may exercise its patent rights against the licensee to prevent import into and sale in the UK. This is the ratio decidendi of the Tilghman8 case.

However, the law in the UK, outside EU law, has been complicated in recent decades by the 'post-Tilghman' line of authorities, in which a number of first instance judgments accepted that where goods were placed on the market by a licensee rather than the patentee themself, the Betts v Willmot principle did not apply. Instead, the rights at common law of the purchaser, and any subsequent purchaser, of the goods were limited by the terms of the licence granted to the licensee. This line of authority stems from a mis-statement of the facts in the Tilghman case by an American court in the 1920s9 and therefore a mis-statement of the principle to be drawn from that case, which was accepted by a court in Kenya in the 1960s10 and then by the Chancery Division in an interim injunction application in 197311. The approach was subsequently followed by the Patents County Court in 199212 and most recently by the Patents Court in 2013 in HTC v Nokia13. The approach of the post-Tilghman line was expressly rejected by the Privy Council in 191114 and is inconsistent with the detailed explanation of the common law approach given by the High Court of Australia in 202015. The post-Tilghman line of judgments therefore represents an area of uncertainty in UK law outside of EU law.

It is against the background described above that the modern-day operation of the principles concerning exhaustion developed by the Court of Justice, during the course of the UK's membership of the EU, falls to be appreciated.

In the 1974 judgment in Centrafarm v Sterling16, the Court of Justice drew upon (what are now) articles 34 and 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (i.e. the free movement of goods provisions) and held that putting goods into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to third parties, exhausted the patentee's patent rights in respect of those goods. (This ruling brought into the law of the UK in respect of patents the first of the fundamental features of the EEA-regional exhaustion regime described above in respect of trademarks. For practical purposes, it was broadly consistent with the operation of the Betts v Willmott principle in the UK).

In 1998, the Court of Justice ruled in Silhouette v Hartlauer17 that because trademark law was harmonised across the EU, Member States could not choose whether or not to operate international exhaustion; the trademarks Directive was a complete code. However, by the time of the UK's exit from the EU, patent law continued not to be harmonised across the EU (despite the efforts of most Member States to bring the planned Unified Patents Court and Unitary patent system into operation) and no case law had expressly introduced in the UK in respect of patents the second fundamental feature noted above of the EEA-regional exhaustion regime in respect of trademarks. It therefore remained unclear whether, in respect of patents, member states could recognise, under their national laws, international exhaustion. There had been no ruling precluding the UK's doctrine of implied licence from continuing to operate to prevent the owner of a UK patent from using patent law to prevent the importation or sale of genuine goods parallel imported from outside the EU/EEA.

In 2018, in the Parainen Pearl Shipping case18, the Patents Court held that for patented goods first placed on the market within the EEA by the patentee, the EEA-regional exhaustion doctrine had superseded UK law in respect of parallel imports. However, the possibility was expressly not excluded that the UK's Betts v Willmott principle / doctrine of implied licence continued to govern the position in respect of patented goods placed on the market outside the EEA and subsequently imported into the UK.

Following the UK's exit from the EU, secondary legislation19 took effect in the UK to maintain the status quo in the UK in respect of exhaustion. Therefore the placing of patented goods on the market in the EU/EEA by the owner of the relevant patent continues to exhaust the patent owner's rights in the UK. However, the legislation did not clarify whether, before the expiry of the transition period, it was compatible for the UK to continue to apply Betts v Willmott in respect of patented goods placed on the market by the owner of the patent or with their consent outside the single market.

Consequently, today it is not accurate to say that the UK's exhaustion regime in respect of patents is/remains that provided for by Court of Justice in respect of trademarks. In view of the long standing authority of Betts v Willmott in the UK20 and the absence of legislative provision or authority overruling it, the better view is probably that for goods first placed on the market outside the EEA, the Betts v Willmott principle, which is an international approach, remains good law in the UK.

The question now is whether a parallel importer chooses to test the possibilities in the UK before the UK Government provides, as a matter of policy, for a longer term approach.

Against this background and the structure of the current UK legislation governing patent law (the Patents Act of 1977), the UK's approach to exhaustion could now be developed in the tradition of the common law (i.e. for patents, the Betts v Willmott principle / doctrine of implied licence) or by the creation of a doctrine of exhaustion. Either approach could be justified by the modern governing legislation. When considering how the UK's exhaustion regime could be developed from this point, stakeholders should be aware of both the historical approach taken in the UK and the modern approaches taken by trading partners of the UK.

Read our detailed paper for a comprehensive analysis of the emergence of patent law in the UK and how it resulted in the UK's approach to exhaustion.

Trademarks and passing off

The cause of action that is today called 'passing off' stems from the protection conferred by the courts (in equity and/or at common law) against other individuals in respect of a person's trading name. It is not based upon a right conferred by the royal prerogative, and so the case law by which the courts have developed the law of passing off in respect of parallel imports of genuine goods is distinct from and different to the lines of authority developed in respect of patents.

However, consistently with the approach taken in respect of patents, the law of passing off in the UK historically has not discriminated between goods originally placed on the market in the UK by the owner of the relevant patent and the same goods first placed on the market by that owner outside the UK and then parallel imported into the UK. The UK's approach to the application of the law of passing off has therefore been international, broadly speaking.

The law in the UK regarding passing off may be summarised as follows:

  • The long-standing principle is that no person is entitled to represent their goods as being the goods of another person (for example, see Farina v Silverlock21). This is reflected in the modern-day tort by the requirement for misrepresentation. In order to establish passing off, three constituent elements must be met: goodwill; misrepresentation; and damage. 22
  • The case law since Farina v Silverlock has established a general position that it is not passing off to import goods marketed abroad by the claimant (or an associated business) and to sell them under the name or mark applied by the claimant because in such circumstances there is no misrepresentation as to the origin of the goods23. This was reflected in the Court of Appeal's 1979 judgment in Revlon v Cripps24.
  • However, since then, judgments in some cases have indicated that where the circumstances are such that sale of the imported goods would give rise to a misrepresentation, passing off may be established. In Sony v Saray25, an interim injunction was awarded where imported goods had been modified without the approval of the plaintiffs and sold without giving notice of this to purchasers and with a purported guarantee that the defendants were not in a position to give: the defendants were ordered to attach disclaiming labels to Sony goods sold by them. In Colgate-Palmolive v Markwell Finance Ltd26 the Court of Appeal confirmed a finding of passing off in respect of imported 'Colgate' toothpaste in circumstances where the brand owner had done their best to secure that lower quality toothpaste was confined to a limited number of markets outside the UK and the defendants importing it had succeeded in circumventing the plaintiffs' precautions. In all cases, the question of whether sale in the UK of genuine goods imported by a defendant from outside the UK amounts to passing off depends upon whether the elements of passing off are established.

The international approach to the law regarding passing off in the UK has meant that its operation has in practice been consistent with the EEA-regional exhaustion doctrine. This is because: the approach does not enable the brand owner to enforce rights in passing off against genuine goods imported into the UK from other EEA countries; for goods imported into the UK from outside the EEA a finding of passing off would be consistent with the EEA-regional exhaustion doctrine; and for goods imported into the UK from outside the EEA a finding of no passing off would also not interfere with or conflict with the operation of the EU's registered trademark system - a cause of action in passing off not being a right, the common law would seem not to conflict with the principle laid down by the Court of Justice in Silhouette v Hartflauer27.

In the UK, registered trademark law in respect of parallel imports, outside of EU law, developed as follows:

  • The UK's registered trademark system was first introduced to codify the protection conferred by the cause of action known as passing off. The registration of a trademark did not confer upon the proprietor a privilege of the type conferred by the Crown in the exercise of the royal prerogative by the grant of a patent28; the registered system had not inferentially altered the conception of a trademark29.
  • Consistently with this, in the early decades of the registered system in the UK, judgments that considered earlier authorities approached questions of registered trademark infringement in respect of parallel imports consistently with questions of passing off. The general position was that import and sale in the UK of goods marketed abroad by the plaintiff (or an associated business) under the name or mark applied by the plaintiff did not infringe the plaintiff's registered trademark in the UK30.
  • For example, in Revlon v Cripps31the Court of Appeal held that a company which manufactured products in different countries could not complain of infringement of the UK trademark in respect of goods manufactured abroad (in that case in the United States) by that company. In that case the exploitation of the mark and the goods to which it related was a world-wide exercise and the court dismissed the claim for trademark infringement (under the Trade Marks Act of 1938).
  • However, in Colgate-Palmolive v Markwell Finance Ltd32, after finding the elements of passing off were satisfied on the facts of that case in view of the lower quality of the imported toothpaste, the Court of Appeal also concluded that there was infringement of the registered trademark. The court's rationale was that the mark applied by the Brazilian company, although identical to the mark registered in the UK, was not the application of the registered UK trademark because it was not within the scope of the "permitted use" of the UK mark, for the purposes of s.4(3)(a) of the UK Trade Marks Act of 1938, in view of the intra-group licensing arrangements. The reasoning appears to have been an attempt by the court to reach an outcome on the question of registered trademark infringement that was consistent with the outcome on the question of passing off. The relevant legislative provisions have been superseded by the Trade Marks Act of 1994.

In the meantime, in 1973 the UK joined the EEC. At that time there was no Community legislation of trademark law. In 1974 the Court of Justice held in the Centrafarm case33 that the effect of the provisions of the EEC Treaty on the free movement of goods was to prohibit between Member States measures restricting imports and all measures of equivalent effect. Putting goods into circulation for the first time in a Member State, either directly or by the grant of licences to third parties, exhausted the registered trademark owner's rights in respect of those goods across the Community. The Centrafarm ruling therefore brought into the law of the UK in respect of trademarks the first of the fundamental features of the EEA-regional exhaustion regime described above.

Interestingly, the Centrafarm judgment was not cited in the Court of Appeal's judgments in the Revlon or Colgate cases: this was consistent with focus of the reasoning in the Centrafarm case being against Member States operating national exhaustion regimes and the UK's approach to parallel imports being more international than that; it also reflected that the disputed goods in the Revlon and Colgate cases had been imported from outside of Europe.

The first EU legislation on registered trademarks was in the form of Council Directive 89/104/EEC. It was implemented in the UK by the Trade Marks Act of 1994. The 1994 Act therefore represented a break with earlier trademark law in the UK.

In 1998, in Silhouette v Hartlauer34, the Court of Justice confirmed that putting goods on the market in the Community meant that the registered trademark rights were exhausted across the Community. (And pursuant to the EEA Agreement, the "Community" extended to the EEA). Further, the Directive could not be interpreted as leaving it open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trademark in respect of products put on the market in non-member countries: national laws recognising international exhaustion were not compatible with the internal market. The Silhouette ruling therefore brought into the law of the UK in respect of trademarks the second of the fundamental features of the EEA-regional exhaustion regime described above.

Further, in joined cases Davidoff and Levi35 the Court of Justice ruled that for goods placed on the market outside the EEA, any consent on the part of the trademark owner to further marketing of the goods within the EEA (i.e. extinguishing the proprietor's exclusive rights as the owner of a registered trademark) would normally have to be express, and it could not be inferred from mere silence on the part of the trademark proprietor. Only in exceptional circumstances could there be implied consent.

Today, the principle of EEA-regional exhaustion is provided for in EU trademarks legislation, and in the UK by section 12 of the Trade Marks Act of 1994 Act. This is done by way of providing a defence to infringement in respect of goods put on the market in the UK or the EU/EEA under the registered trademark by the proprietor or with their consent. Following Brexit, the UK continues to recognise and apply the EEA-regional exhaustion regime36.

Against this background, the UK's approach to exhaustion could now be developed in the tradition of the common law or by the creation of a doctrine of exhaustion. When considering how the UK's exhaustion regime could be developed from this point, stakeholders should be aware of both the historical approach taken in the UK and the modern approaches taken by trading partners of the UK.

Read our detailed paper for a comprehensive analysis of the emergence of patent law in the UK and how it resulted in the UK's approach to exhaustion.

Footnotes

1. Centrafarm BV & Anr v Sterling Drug Inc (Case 15/74) and Centrafarm BV & Anr v Withrop BV (Case 16/74), 31 October 1974

2. Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH Case C-355/96, 28 September 1998 [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 267, [1998] 9 WLUK 261

3. Centrafarm BV & Anr v Sterling Drug Inc (Case 15/74) and Centrafarm BV & Anr v Withrop BV (Case 16/74), 31 October 1974; Parainen Pearl Shipping Limited & Ors v Kristian Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi AS & Ors [2018] EWHC 2628 (Pat)

4. Betts v Willmott (1870-71) LR 6 Ch App 239, Chancery Appeals Court, Lord Hatherley L.C.; Incandescent Gas Light Co Ltd v Cantelo (1895) 12 RPC 262, High Court Queen's Bench Division; Incandescent Gas Light Co Ltd v Brogden (1899) 16 RPC 179, High Court, Queen's Bench Division; Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Isler [1906] 1 Ch 605 at 610, High Court Chancery Division; The Scottish Vacuum Cleaner O. Ltd v. The Provincial Cinematograph Theatres Ltd 1915 1 S.L.T. 389, Court of Session; Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd v Longlife Battery Depot [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1033, High Court Chancery Division; Sterling Drug Incorporated v C.H. Beck Limited & Anr [1973] RPC 915, High Court Chancery Division; Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd & Anr v. Barton [1977] R.P.C. 537, High Court Chancery Division; Roussel Uclaf S.A. v Hockley International Ltd. & Anr [1996] RPC 441, Patents Court; United Wire Ltd v Screen Repair Services (Scotland) Ltd [2000] UKHL 42, House of Lords; Schütz (UK) Limited v Werit (UK) Limited [2013] UKSC 16, Supreme Court; HTC Corporation v Nokia Corporation [2013] EWHC 3247 (Pat), Patents Court; and Parainen Pearl Shipping Limited & Ors v Kristian Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi AS & Ors [2018] EWHC 2628 (Pat) Patents Court

5. Betts v Willmott (1870-71) LR 6 Ch App 239, Chancery Appeals Court, Lord Hatherley L.C.

6. Incandescent Gas Light Co Ltd v Cantelo (1895) 12 RPC 262, High Court Queen's Bench Division; Incandescent Gas Light Co Ltd v Brogden (1899) 16 RPC 179, High Court, Queen's Bench Division; Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Isler [1906] 1 Ch 605 at 610, High Court Chancery Division; The Scottish Vacuum Cleaner O. Ltd v. The Provincial Cinematograph Theatres Ltd 1915 1 S.L.T. 389, Court of Session; Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd v Longlife Battery Depot [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1033, High Court Chancery Division; Sterling Drug Incorporated v C.H. Beck Limited & Anr [1973] RPC 915, High Court Chancery Division; Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd & Anr v. Barton [1977] R.P.C. 537, High Court Chancery Division; Roussel Uclaf S.A. v Hockley International Ltd. & Anr [1996] RPC 441, High Court Patents Court

7. United Wire Ltd v Screen Repair Services (Scotland) Ltd [2000] UKHL 42, House of Lords; Schütz (UK) Limited v Werit (UK) Limited [2013] UKSC 16, Supreme Court

8. Société Anonyme des Manufactures de Glaces v Tilghman's Patent Sand Blast Company (1883) 25 Ch D 1, Court of Appeal

9. Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation v United Aircraft Engineering Corporation 266 Fed. 71 (1920)

10. Beecham Group Ltd v Shewan Tomes (Traders) Ltd [1968] RPC 268, High Court of Kenya

11. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company & Anr v Geerpres Europe Limited [1973] FSR 133, High Court Chancery Division

12. Wellcome Foundation Limited v Discpharm Limited & Ors [1993] FSR 433, Patents County Court

13. HTC Corporation v Nokia Corporation [2013] EWHC 3247 (Pat), High Court Patents Court

14. National Phonograph Co of Australia Ltd v Menck (1911) 12 CLR 15; [1911] AC 336, Privy Council

15. Calidad Pty Ltd & Ors v Seiko Epson Corporation & Anr [2020] HCA 41, High Court of Australia

16. Centrafarm BV & Anr v Sterling Drug Inc (Case 15/74) and Centrafarm BV & Anr v Withrop BV (Case 16/74), 31 October 1974

17. Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH Case C-355/96, 28 September 1998 [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 267, [1998] 9 WLUK 261

18. Parainen Pearl Shipping Limited & Ors v Kristian Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi AS & Ors [2018] EWHC 2628 (Pat)

19. The Intellectual Property (Exhaustion of Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

20. in particular, Roussel Uclaf S.A. v Hockley International Ltd. & Anr [1996] RPC 441 (Patents Court), United Wire Ltd v Screen Repair Services (Scotland) Ltd [2000] UKHL 42, Schütz (UK) Limited v Werit (UK) Limited [2013] UKSC 16, HTC Corporation v Nokia Corporation [2013] EWHC 3247 (Pat), and Parainen Pearl Shipping Limited & Ors v Kristian Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi AS & Ors [2018] EWHC 2628 (Pat)

21. Farina v Silverlock (1856) 43 E.R. 1214, Court of Chancery; Singer Manufacturing Company v Loog (1880) 18 Ch. D. 395, Court of Appeal; (1882) 8 App. Cas. 15, House of Lords

22. Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491; Starbucks (UK) Ltd & Anr v British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc & Ors [2015] UKSC 31, Supreme Court

23. Imperial Tobacco Company of India, Limited v Bonnan & Ors [1924] A.C. 755, Privy Council; Champagne Heidsiek et Cie Monopole SA v Buxton [1930] 1 Ch 330, High Court Chancery Division

24. Revlon Inc & Ors v Cripps & Lee Ltd & Ors [1980] FSR 85, Court of Appeal

25. Sony v Saray Electronics [1983] RFSR 302, Court of Appeal

26. Colgate-Palmolive v Markwell Finance Ltd [1989] RPC 497, Court of Appeal

27. Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH Case C-355/96, 28 September 1998 [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 267, [1998] 9 WLUK 261

28. Bow v Hart [1905] 1 K.B. 592, 593, 594, Court of Appeal

29. Aristoc Limited v Rysta Limited [1945] A.C. 68, House of Lords

30. Champagne Heidsiek et Cie Monopole SA v Buxton [1930] 1 Ch 330, High Court Chancery Division

31. Revlon Inc & Ors v Cripps & Lee Ltd & Ors [1980] FSR 85, Court of Appeal

32. Colgate-Palmolive v Markwell Finance Ltd [1989] RPC 497, Court of Appeal

33. Centrafarm BV & Anr v Sterling Drug Inc (Case 15/74) and Centrafarm BV & Anr v Winthrop BV (Case 16/74), 31 October 1974 - [1974] E.C.R. 1183; [174] 2 C. M.L.R. 480

34. Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH Case C-355/96, 28 September 1998 [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 267, [1998] 9 WLUK 261

35. Zino Davidoff v A&G Imports Ltd, Levi Strauss v Tesco, Levi Strauss v Costco (C-414/99 to C-416/99) 20 November 2001

36. The Intellectual Property (Exhaustion of Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

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