Weagle v Kendall, 2023 NSCA 47
Judge: Justice Carole A. Beaton
Subject Matter: Parenting Time; Relocation
The father appealed from the trial judge's decision allowing the mother to relocate their child from Halifax to Ottawa. The appeal was allowed, and the matter sent for a rehearing with another judge.
The judge erred in overemphasizing the reasons the father could not act as a primary parent and thereby effectively shifted the father's burden of proof under the Parenting and Support Act. The judge also erred in the interpretation of s 18H(3) of the Act, by improperly limiting the range of parenting options she could have considered in not examining certain evidence, not assessing all relevant factors required to be considered, and not sufficiently focusing on whether the move was in the child's best interests, placing greater emphasis on the mother's interests in relocating.
Pottie v Boudreau, 2023 NSCA 40
Judge: Justice Cindy Bourgeois
Subject Matter: Filing Accommodation; Appeal; Access to Justice
This decision is the result of Mr. Pottie's Appeal of two orders coming from the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia dated February 17, 2023. The order allowed Ms. Boudreau to travel internationally with the children and obtain the required travel documents without Mr. Pottie's consent.
Mr. Pottie asked for relief from the technical requirements of the Appeal under Civil Procedure Rule 90. Specifically, he asked to be relieved of the production of 5 appeal books for the use of the Court, and the requirement to deliver a paper copy to Ms. Boudreau, due to cost proving to be prohibitive. Mr. Pottie requested to be allowed to use the copier available at the Court at no cost, to serve Ms. Boudreau electronically, and to be relieved of any other costs that may arise pursuant to his appeal.
The Court dismissed Mr. Pottie's motion for accommodation. The Court outlined that the cost of an appeal should not be weighed in isolation. The merits of the appeal, the impact of the accommodation on Court resources, procedural fairness on the other party and whether appeal is brought in bad faith should also be considered by the Court before awarding accommodation.
Although Mr. Pottie did demonstrate financial hardship, he failed to address the projected costs in anticipation of the preparation of the appeal books. Additionally, the Court explained that Mr. Pottie had failed to demonstrate the merits of his appeal.
Murphy v Ibrahim 2023 NSCA 42
Judge: Justice Peter Bryson, Justice Elizabeth Van den Eynden, and Justice Carole Beaton
Subject: Apprehension of Bias; Parenting Time; Supervised Parenting Time; Parental Capacity
The appellant, Ms. Murphy, and the respondent, Mr. Ibrahim, had one child together. In June of 2020, Ms. Murphy brought an Application to Vary, which was heard in September, 2021. In his 2022 NSSC decision the judge varied a 2017 parenting order. Ms. Murphy's parenting time and child support were varied and she was ordered to participate in a psychological assessment. The judge also ordered that Ms. Murphy's parenting time be supervised, and that Ms. Murphy pay costs. Ms. Murphy appealed and brought a motion for a stay of all three orders.
The motion to stay was granted in part in Murphy v Ibrahim, 2022 NSCA 75. Ms. Murphy's parenting time had been ordered supervised over twelve, 1.5 hour sessions at Veith House. This twelve-session limit was stayed. Ms. Murphy had been ordered to attend a psychological assessment as a pre-condition for a variation of the judge's variation order. This pre-condition requirement was stayed (although Ms. Murphy was still ordered to attend a psychological assessment). The order for costs was also stayed.
In this case, the Court of Appeal found that Ms. Murphy was appealing on five main points:
- sufficiency of reasons;
- reasonable apprehension of bias;
- errors of law, mixed fact and law, or of fact;
- ineffective assistance of counsel; and
- error in awarding costs.
It was held that the judge's reasons appropriately considered the best interests of the child factors found in s. 18(6) of the Parenting and Support Act, RSNS 1989, c. 160 and were sufficient to permit appellate review.
Ms. Murphy claimed that all the requests and motions she brought were denied, while all of the requests Mr. Ibrahim brought were granted, and this demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the judge had managed the case appropriately.
Ms. Murphy identified many areas she argued were errors of law, mixed fact and law, and fact. The Court of Appeal declined to address each individually but chose to review several points to demonstrate their lack of merit. The Court held that the judge had correctly identified and considered the best interests of the child throughout the decision. Ms. Murphy argued that the judge had not considered the maximum contact principle when considering parenting time. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the judge had correctly identified that supervised access was not a long-term arrangement, and had also correctly considered the child's best interests, rather than Ms. Murphy's, when making an order for parenting time.
Ineffectiveness of counsel was held to not be a valid ground of appeal, as this case didn't meet the "rarest of civil cases where a very compelling public interest is engaged" standard described in Kedmi v Korem, 2012 NSCA 103, para 41.
Ms. Murphy's appeal on costs was also rejected, as the judge had considered the history of the matter, the positions taken by the parties and their respective successes on the issues raised.
The appeal was dismissed and Ms. Murphy was ordered to pay costs.
D.D. v M.P., 2023 NSSC 192
Judge: Justice Lorne MacDowell
Subject matter: Parenting; allegations of abuse from third party
The parties have a five-year-old child, diagnosed with autism. Both the mother and father sought primary care of the child. The mother has other children, including a 17-year-old, V.D.
The father claimed that the child should be in his primary care because the child was allegedly sexually abused by V.D. The father also claimed that he is better equipped to provide the child with educational support, proper nutrition, routine sleep, and cultural ties.
The mother denied all allegations that V.D. had sexually abused the child. She argued that she is able to deal with her son's autism diagnosis and provide the child with strong community support. The mother claimed that the father had been emotionally abusive to her during and after their relationship.
The Court concluded that the father had not proven that V.D. had sexually abused the child. The Court noted that the father had not shared his concerns of abuse until after the litigation between parties began.
On the issue of care, the Court held that it is in the child's best interests to be placed in the mother's primary care due to evidence that she is more capable of ensuring that the child's physical, medical, emotional, cultural, and social welfare needs are met. The evidence supported that the father had a history of controlling and intimidating behavior to the mother in the child's presence.
T.W. v G.S., 2023 NSSC 179
Judge: Justice Lee Anne MacLeod-Archer
Subject Matter: Parenting time; Imputing Income; Intentional underemployment; Child Support
T.W. and G.S. were common law partners for 23 years. They separated in 2017, after T.W. reported to the police that she found child pornography on G.S.'s computer. The parties had two children together, born in 2012 and 2015.
T.W., sought primary care of her children with supervised parenting time for the G.S. every second weekend. G.S. sought shared parenting.
While Justice Macleod-Archer found that both parties lack insight into the impact their behaviour has on their children, she was satisfied that the best interests of the children are served by being in TW's primary care.
Justice Macleod-Archer indicated that the onus rested on T.W. to show that supervised parenting time was necessary and in the best interests of the children. Justice Macleod-Archer ordered that G.S. will have parenting time through the Department of Justice's supervised parenting and exchange program twice per week. However, if G.S. cooperates with Child Protective Services and completes an assessment done by a forensic psychiatrist, the Court will review the report and consider the possibility of G.S. being able to return to unsupervised parenting time.
Further, the Justice Macleod-Archer found that although G.S. was in receipt of CPP disability benefits, he had failed to prove that he is currently dealing with a disability. Because of this, it was determined that G.S was intentionally unemployed. Justice Mcleod-Archer found it appropriate to then impute the annual income of G.S. in the amount of $74,319.00 for 2019-2023. Subsequently, G.S. was ordered to pay child support based on this imputed income rather than based on the CPP disability benefits he had been receiving.
Hilchey v Speight, 2023 NSSC 165
Judge: Justice Daniel Ingersoll
Subject matter: Parenting; Custody; Child Support
The parties have two children, aged 11 and 7. The children spend equal time with each parent pursuant to shared parenting agreement. Mr. Hilchey pays the full table amount of child support to Ms. Speight.
Mr. Hilchey sought to vary the child support amount. Ms. Speight sought to have the Court review the parenting arrangement, requesting primary care of both children.
Ms. Speight's argued that the children experienced behavioral issues as a result of the shared parenting agreement and would benefit from her primary care. Justice Ingersoll found that the evidence did not establish that the children's behavioral concerns were caused or aggravated by the fact of shared parenting. The Court found that the shared parenting arrangement was in the children's best interest in light of the factors set out in Gibney v. Conohan and Hammond v. Nelson. In particular, the fact that both parents had demonstrated an ability to support and comfort the child, and a firm commitment to the children's needs, supported a shared parenting agreement.
On the issue of child support, Mr. Hilchey sought to lower his child support obligation due to Ms. Speight's income increasing and her earning a diploma in early childhood development. The Court accepted that these changes constituted a material change in circumstances, permitting consideration of Mr. Hilchey's application to vary child support. The Court to reduce Ms. Hilchey's child support obligation to reflect the set-off amount between the parties.
Nadeau v LaKing, 2023 NSSC 172
Judge: Justice Elizabeth Jollimore
Subject: Unjust Enrichment; Partition Act
This decision deals with a property division between the parties and a claim of unjust enrichment by Mr. Nadeau.
After deducting notional disposition costs, Justice Jollimore found the value of the joint house to be $776,412.50. With regard to division, Justice Jollimore cited the Partition Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 333, which provides that real estate must be divided or, if that is not possible, ordered to be sold if the parties own land as joint tenants. Further, under the Partition Act, there is a presumption of equal sharing if the parties hold the property in joint names, which was the case here. Ms. LaKing failed to rebut this presumption, so the principle of equal division remains.
Moreover, Ms. LaKing owes Mr. Nadeau $4,632 from her share of the net equity in the house because Mr. Nadeau continued to make payments on the mortgage from November 2021 through June 2022 after the separation and his move out of the House. Mortgage and property tax payments made by one party after a separation while there is exclusive possession are routinely considered in dividing the value of the jointly-held property.
Finally, Justice Jollimore found that Ms. LaKing must pay Mr. Nadeau $6,000 as compensation for her enrichment regarding Mr. Nadeau's work performance at Ms. LaKing's cottage. Unjust enrichment exists where Ms. LaKing received a benefit or enrichment that Mr. Nadeau conferred on her to his detriment, and there is no juristic reason for her enrichment. Mr. Nadeau proved that he renovated the cottage without legal reason, which was solely owned by Ms. LaKing, and that this increased the value of the cottage.
In contrast, Mrs. LaKing is not entitled to a refund for the interest payments she made on the joint loan. She cannot claim that her payment of all interests and fees unjustly enriched Mr. Nadeau because there was a legal reason for Ms. LaKing to make those interest payments: she was contractually obliged to make payments on the credit line debt.
Clark v Ewing, 2023 NSSC 174
Judge: Justice Ann Smith
Subject Matter: Standing; Unjust Enrichment; Separation Agreement
Mr. Clark is suing his daughter and her husband (the "Ewings") for unjust enrichment. Mr. Clark claims he gave the couple $35,000.00 as a loan to purchase their home, with the stipulation that he would be able to construct an in-law suite on the property. The construction on the suite began May 2011 and was completed in September 2011. Mr. Clark and his spouse would spend six months at the suite annually before departing for Florida during the winter months.
Mr. Clark's relationship with his daughter and wife deteriorated over a number of years after the construction of the in-law suite. Mr. Clark separated from his wife in December of 2012. In a separation agreement dated January 1, 2023, drafted by Mr. Clark without legal counsel, he transferred his interest in the property to his wife. At this time, Mrs. Clark began living in the suite full-time. Further separation agreements were signed in 2019. Mr. Clark claimed that he never extinguished his equitable title to the in-law suite.
Over the course of this action, it became clear that Mr. Clark was always planning on separating from his wife and leaving her to live in the suite closest to her daughter. Her daughter stated that if she knew of this plan, she would have never agreed to the $35,000.00. The plan was always for her parents to live on the property for 6 months, and to move to a long-term home should they ever be a "burden".
The Ewings decided to sell their home in 2014. Upon completion of the sale, the Ewings paid Mrs. Clark $50,000.00. Mr. Clark claims an entitlement to some of the proceeds of the sale. The Court concluded that although the separation agreement executed in 2013 was without legal counsel, it was binding. Mr. Clark had no entitlement to the property and therefore no standing. He could not claim any proceeds from the sale of the home.
Walker v Wilkie, 2023 NSSC 189
Judge: Justice Lee Anne MacLeod-Archer
Subject Matter: Child Support; Imputing Income
This is a decision on a request by Mr. Walker to vary the amount of child support owed to Ms. Wilkie under their Corollary Relief Judgment. Mr. Walker argued for a reduction in child support payable due to a change in circumstances due to the Covid-19 pandemic. He was laid off and then terminated from employment in the oil industry overseas and at one point was entirely reliant on CERB income of $2,000/month. Ms. Wilkie asked the Court to impute an income of $150,000 for 2020 and each year since, based on his income history and reported income in 2020.
Justice MacLeod-Archer followed the law on imputing income as synthesized by Justice Forgeron in Standing v MacInnis, 2020 NSSC 304, which allows the Court to impute income to a child support payor if they are underemployed, "provided the underemployment does not arise because of the needs of the child or they payor's reasonable educational or health needs." In imputing income, the Court must arrive at a fair estimate of income that weighs objective factors to assess whether a payor is intentionally underemployed.
The Court found that there was no need to impute income to Mr. Walker for 2020 as his reported income was higher than what was in the Corollary Relief Judgment. The Court refrained from imputing income for 2021 as he attempted to return overseas to work but ran into visa trouble and was returned to Canada. The Court held that in 2022 and 2023 he was underemployed, as he is highly qualified, with 25+ years of experience in the oil industry, pandemic travel restrictions were eased, and there was "no evidence of health or other reasons for his failure to resume work in a more remunerative position." The Court imputed an income of $100,000 to Mr. Wilkie for 2022 and 2023 and directed him to pay 50% of the child's uninsured orthodontic and dental expenses.
MacDonald v McDonald (Mombourquette), 2023 NSSC 153
Judge: Associate Chief Justice Lawrence I. O'Neil
Subject Matter: Disclosure; Separation Agreements; Enforceability
This matter concerned a separation agreement executed between the parties that provided that the parties' disclosure obligations were satisfied. The petitioner sought to move for a divorce, as contemplated in the separation agreement, which the respondent replied to by filing a notice for motion to set aside the separation agreement based on non-disclosure and for disclosure on a wide range of information about the current financial circumstances of the Petitioner.
Both parties received independent legal advice. The separation agreement provided a waiver of additional financial statements for both parties. The petitioner argued the disclosure of his private information is irrelevant and that the issue was the efficacy of the separation agreement. The Court held the enforceability of the separation agreement should be decided before the disclosure issue is addressed.
Low v Smith, 2023 NSSC 195
Judge: Justice Cindy G. Cormier
Subject: Relocation; Imputed Income
The parties both grew up in Nova Scotia. Their first child was born in Nova Scotia in 2016. The parties moved to the USA with their child in 2017. They married and their second child was born in the USA in 2018. In 2019 the father filed for divorce in Utah but was unable to serve the mother personally. The mother left the father and returned to Halifax with the children. The parties appeared for a hearing at the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Family Division) in 2019. The parties were in a nearly constant state of conflict and legal proceedings since then.
The mother filed an emergency request in July 2020, stating that she had not seen the children since the father picked them up and drove away. She further stated that she was concerned the father would leave the province or country and file for divorce in the USA without providing her with notice. She was also unaware of where the children were staying and was concerned that they were with their paternal grandfather, who she believed had been convicted of child molestation.
In January 2021, the father's income was imputed at or $54,398.80 CAD. He was ordered to pay the table amount of $758.00 a month, plus extraordinary expenses for a total of $1,318.00 a month. The issues of whether the mother could claim additional extraordinary expenses and whether the father's travel expenses constituted undue hardship were left unanswered. The parties agreed to attempt to negotiate these issues.
In May 2022, the mother confirmed that she was still seeking an order to terminate the father's parenting leave, claiming it was causing emotional disturbances in the children's lives. In October 2022, the mother changed her position, requesting a detailed order specifying parenting time for the father, including allowing him to take the children to Utah. The father argued that it was in the children's best interests to allow them to relocate to Utah, and expressed concerns about them living with the mother who was working long hours and attending school.
In this decision, the Court ordered the father not to take the children out of Nova Scotia except with the Court's permission. The mother was given final decision-making authority regarding education, medical and dental care and the children's religious affiliations and practices. The mother was ordered to provide monthly updates regarding the children, to notify the father in advance of any medical or professional appointments, and to consult with him before any non-emergency decisions affecting the children's lives. The mother would also have primary care of the children.
The father was allowed to take the children to Utah for 2 weeks during their summer break, and a complex schedule of alternating years for Christmas and March breaks was ordered. The parties were ordered to communicate using OurFamilyWizard.
The father's income was found to be $32,207 for the period between April 1, 2021, and March 2022, requiring a child support payment of $486.73 a month for this period. It was found to be $54,398.80 for the period between April 1, 2022, and October 1, 2022, requiring a child support payment of $775 a month for this period.
The father was ordered to actively inquire about the children's paternal grandfather's criminal record, and to prevent the children from having any contact with him without the Court's permission.
Sprague v Stewart, 2023 NSSC 205
Judge: Justice Cindy G. Cormier
Subject Matter: Child Support
Mr. Sprague and Ms. Stewart have two children. This is a decision on a request from Mr. Sprague vary the child support payable to Ms. Stewart regarding one of the children. Specifically, Mr. Sprague sought to terminate child support going forward, to be credited for some child support payments made based on the wording of the agreement, and to be reimbursed for payments made towards a school trip that was cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Ms. Stewart requested the Court to change the Corollary Relief Judgement seeking Mr. Sprague to contribute to Hannah's special post-secondary education.
Mr. Sprague argued that his order should be granted to terminate child support since the child ceased to be a dependent child, turning 19 in 2022. The child attended special post-secondary education last year and the question was before the Court as to whether Mr. Sprague and Ms. Stewart should contribute 25% each towards the child's special post-secondary expenses. Ms. Stewart requested, and Mr. Sprague refused to contribute to the child's special post-secondary expenses. Ms. Stewart argued that the child continued to be a dependent child as the child was enrolled in a further program relating to her career of choice.
Justice Cindy Cormier determined that during the period the child worked full-time, Mr. Sprague shall be reimbursed for his child support paid. The justice further ordered both Mr. Sprague and Ms. Stewart to each pay the child towards special post-secondary education expenses. Mr. Sprague was also entitled to a credit toward any child support due from contributions he made toward the cancelled school trip.
Ms. Stewart asked that the justice order Mr. Sprague continue to pay thew table amount of child support for the child between May 2022 (when the child turned 19) until the end of April 2023 (when the child finishes their post-secondary education). Justice Cormier found that the child, who was living with their mother, was financially unable to live independently and since Ms. Stewart maintained a home for the child, Justice Cormier ordered Mr. Sprague to pay the table amount of child support until the end of April 2023.
Findlay v Bent, 2023 NSSC 166
Judge: Justice Daniel W. Ingersoll
Subject Matter: Child Support; Adult Child; Special Expenses
Mr. Findlay and Ms. Bent lived together from 1997-2014 without marrying. They have three daughters, aged 21, 18, and 15. Pursuant to a Consent Order in 2016, Mr. Findlay paid monthly child support of $1,034.00, together with $150.00 per month towards childcare expenses.
Mr. Findlay sought recovery of what he alleged to be overpayments towards child support and childcare. He argued that his obligation to pay child support for the eldest daughter had ended when she ceased living with either parent, or alternatively when she graduated high school and did not continue her education or seek work. He also argued that his obligation to contribute towards childcare expenses ended in September 2019 when the family stopped paying for childcare.
Justice Ingersoll began by considering at what point Mr. Findlay's obligation to support his eldest daughter ceased. Justice Ingersoll rejected the argument that the obligation ended when the eldest daughter elected to move out of her mother's house and live at a friend's house. He found that Ms. Bent had continued to support the daughter financially during this period, and that the daughter had ultimately returned to her mother's home. Given these facts, the obligation to pay child support would only have ended if Mr. Findlay could establish that this would have been in the best interests of the child. He did not establish this. However, Justice Ingersoll found that the obligation to pay child support ceased after the daughter graduated high school and did not seek work within a reasonable "transition period." He calculated that Mr. Findlay had overpaid child support by a total of $2,291.00 and ordered that this be recouped by reducing his child support payments in connection with his two younger daughters by $229.10 per month for ten months.
Justice Ingersoll also found that Mr. Findlay's obligation to contribute towards childcare ended when the family no longer required childcare services. He found that Mr. Findlay had overpaid $5,500.00 in such contributions. Both parties agreed that this overpayment should be held in abeyance pending adjudication of a claim by Ms. Bent for retroactive repayment of child support and special or extraordinary expenses. Justice Ingersoll agreed to hold it in abeyance, but on the condition that Ms. Bent's claim is placed before the Court for adjudication within one year. He ordered that if the matter is not adjudicated within one year, repayment will commence through a monthly deduction of $220.00 Mr. Findlay's child support payments for twenty-five months.
Day v Day, 2023 NSSC 186
Judge: Justice C. LouAnn Chiasson
Subject Matter: Child Support; Imputed Income; Undue Hardship
Mr. Day applied to the Court to lower his child support. He stated that he was unable to pay the child support arrears and testified that his income was not as high as the income imputed by the Court in 2019. Mr. Day sought to adjust his child support retroactively based on income tax returns. Ms. Day contests these claims made by Mr. Day, stating that he could earn the income imputed to him.
Mr. Day asserted that he is in dire financial circumstances and his statement of income disclosed an annual income of $40,440. Mr. Day previously did not voluntarily pay his Court ordered child support and as a result, there is currently a garnishee with Mr. Day's employer.
Honourable Justice Chiasson went over how the Court imputed income to Mr. Day in 2019 and stated that Mr. Day did not provide evidence that the previous imputation of income was inappropriate. The Court in this case determined that Mr. Day's arrears of child support would not be adjusted as there was nothing in the evidence to disclose that there was a material change in Mr. Day's income to warrant any adjustment of the arrears owing. Justice Chiasson also kept the garnishees in place considering Mr. Day previously did not voluntarily pay the child support.
Edwards v Edwards, 2023 NSSC 203
Judge: Justice Elizabeth Jollimore
Subject Matter: Costs; reasonable fees
This matter dealt with a dispute over costs related to a previous decision, 2023 NSSC 141. In 2023 NSSC 141, Mr. Edwards was successful and entitled to costs.
Ms. Lysens argued that each party should pay their own costs considering Mr. Edwards made false statements in his affidavit and was unsuccessful in a request to have Justice Jollimore to take judicial notice of government documents which supported his case. She also argued that Justice Jollimore should consider the child's best interests and deny the costs request. Mr. Edwards
Justice Jollimore accepted Ms. Lysens' point regarding Mr. Edwards' statements. Her ladyship confirmed that she may withhold costs in cases where a child's best interests are at issue and fear of a costs award might deter a parent from pursing matters that are relevant to the child's best interests. However, Justice Jollimore rejected Ms. Lysens' claim and awarded costs.
Mr. Edwards sought 66% of his legal fees, amounting to $19,597.85. Justice Jollimore was critical of the amount billed for various tasks, and determined the actual fees were not reasonable for the purpose of a costs award.
Justice Jollimore concluded that $11,000 of costs for the 1 issue, 1 day trial would be reasonable. She ordered Ms. Lysens to pay Mr. Edwards $7,150 as a substantial contribution to reasonable fees.
Regulations summary
Pursuant to our blog post dated March 23, 2023, legislative amendments to Part I of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act (the "Act") were set to come into force in November 2023. This past month, an issue in the Canada Gazette shared that these amendments will come into force on November 15, 2023. These amendments are intended to support courts and provincial entities in circumstances where a parent fails to comply with their obligation to disclose financial information.
This issue of the Gazette also outlines new regulations that will support these amendments. Specifically, the issue introduced the Release of Information for Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Regulations (the "New Regulations"). These regulations will repeal and replace the Release of Information for Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Regulations (the "Current Regulations"). A portion of the New Regulations come into force on November 15, 2023. However, some of these Regulations (Subsection 3(2), subparagraphs 5(1)(c)(ii) to (xxiv), paragraph 5(1)(d), subparagraphs 5(2)(c)(ii) and (iii), 8(1)(d)(ii) and (iii) and 9(1)(c)(ii) to (vi) and sections 11 to 13) come into force on November 15, 2024.
The Current Regulations
The Current Regulations outline that applications for the release of information must be submitted through a prescribed application form. The Current Regulations state that a court, a provincial enforcement service or a peace officer must submit this application. The entity that submits the application must submit an affidavit in support of the application, using a prescribed template. The Current Regulations also designate information banks that may be searched under Part I of the Act and outline how the information is to be released from one entity to the other. These Current Regulations also outline how this information is to be released to the Minister of Justice.
The New Regulations
The New Regulations specify the type of information that can be searched, which entity this information can be released to and in what circumstances it may be released to them. They define new entities that can submit an application for release of information. The New Regulations list new information banks that may be searched, as well as the names of departments that are responsible for these banks. The New Regulations specify that the Minister of Justice can assist these banks in conducting a search for information.
The New Regulations remove the requirement that an application for the release of information must be made on a prescribed form. Instead, the New Regulations list specific information that must be included in an application. The New Regulations also remove the requirement that a provincial enforcement service must submit an affidavit to support an application.
Policy Reasons for Updating the Regulations
The New Regulations are intended to improve the enforcement tools available to provinces and territories. The New Regulations aim to balance this objective with considerations of privacy by ensuring that only the most necessary information gets released. Additionally, the New Regulations are intended help determine fair and accurate support amounts. In doing so, the Regulations are intended to improve access to justice and reduce poverty for parents and children who are affected by separation and divorce.
Please see Part II, Vol. 157, No. 13 of the Canada Gazette for the full issue. The entries can be found here at page 1825 and 1876.
Costs of Implementing the Regulations
The cost of implementing the Regulations will be low. Resources and funding used to implement amendments to federal support enforcement legislation will absorb the federal costs. Provincially and territorially, the implementation of these regulations will require computer system changes and staff training.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
